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The Appellants Robert & Jackie Face respectfully submits our brief 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 
Sections 78-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated, the Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction" and "the Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals 
any matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of 
the June 28, 2006 Order and Final Judgment by Judge Lindberg attached. 
The ultimate legal questions involve whether the district court abused its 
discretion in dismissing appellant's case with prejudice, whether imperative 
Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 74. were violated in regard to 
withdrawal of counsel after certificate of readiness for trial had been filed, 
whether appellants, namely Robert L. Face an American with disability 
involving a brain injury unable to represent himself, rights of due process 
were violated and if as an accommodation under the Americans with 
iv 
Disability Act the court erred in not ensuring that Robert L. Face maintain 
representation. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, OR RULES 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, Article I § 7; 
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION, AMENDMENT V; 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV; 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES, RULE 74 (2004). 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is a personal injury case involving Mr. Robert Face and his wife 
Mrs. Jackie Face. Mr. Face was a productive hard working provider for his family 
employed by utility company for more than 25 years. Mr. Face worked his way up 
to a journeyman substation electrician status earning near a six figure income. Just 
at a point in the Faces lives when they were beginning to enjoying the fruits of 
their labors, an accident at the hands of respondents, turned there lives upside 
down. Mr. Face, now totally disabled, sustained a severe brain injury, leaving him 
helpless and dependant upon his wife and family for most and at times all of his 
needs and care. Mr. Face cannot work or represent himself. Mrs. Face cares for 
her husband and family while working endless hours to survive on a fraction of 
what Mr. Face was providing prior to injuries. In the pursuit of justice, we 
encountered our court system for the first time. While we have always held high 
regard to the important function our courts serve, errors encountered by the lower 
court has left us in dismay and disbelief. It is apparent to us that the lower court 
system was more interested in ramming our case to end than ensure protection of 
our right to be heard and have our day in court. It has been difficult to raise money 
and time for Robert to undergo all testing, diagnostic and evaluations necessary to 
properly assess causation of Robert's brain injury in relation to the accident and 
determine Robert's long term prospects. We believe that the complexities of this 
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case are unique, based upon limited knowledge in the area of Roberts type of brain 
injury, requiring more time than the average injury case. We know our case was 
actively pursued based upon costs and time expended up through shortly after 
settlement negotiations were under way. We believe that pressures applied by the 
lower court resulted with our counsel filing a questionable certificate of readiness 
for trial and then without justification or reason withdrew from the case absent our 
knowledge, consent or input. Said pressures also served to advantage respondent 
involving a large insurance company equipped with unlimited resources to retain 
high priced defense counsel not interested injustice but rather disposal of our case 
which was accomplished in just a little more than three years. 
During one proceeding the court assured us that we would receive the time 
we need to find counsel, then respondents filed a motion to dismiss days after 
prospective replacement counsel contacted Mr. Plant. We only knew to file a 
motion for enlargement to allow counsel to respond considering Robert is unable 
to respond or represent himself and we were moving forward as we understood the 
court advised. At time of dismissal, our case was being reviewed by another 
prospective attorney. Respondent's motion to dismiss left out two important facts: 
1) their counsel had been by prospective attorney contacted which verified 
we were actively pursuing replacement counsel; and 
2) Judge Himonas stated in open court "No problem, I will give you the time 
you need." (relative to the obtainment of new counsel) 
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What law firm really wants a case prepared by other counsel all the way to a 
questionable certificate of readiness for trial which also has is subject to a lien? 
We submit that the court erred in allowing our counsel to withdraw in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner inconsistent with imperative provisions under Rule 74 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. We also believe and the record reflects that both officers 
of the court misled and misrepresented facts resulting in errors. We have faith that 
checks and balances safeguarded through our higher courts will correct the 
injustice our case encountered upon having been dismissed with prejudice. 
Respondents inactions to move the case forward themselves, rather filing a motion 
to dismiss after we lost counsel, days after prospective replacement counsel 
contacted them, was not only unethical but also smacks of an ambush tactic. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is based upon the record of this case in the pleadings 
of the parties, including memorandum and supporting addenda in the lower court. 
1. 03-14-03: Complaint filed (R. 1-8); 
2. 04-10-03: Answer filed (R. 9-13); 
DISCOVERY PROCESS BASED UPON RECORD INDEX 
3. 04-22-03: PLAINTIFF'S subpoenas records from American Fork Hospital 
& Work Care (R. 16-21); 
4. 06-09-03: PLAINTIFF'S Rule 26 (a)(1) Initial Disclosures ( R. 40-42); 
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5. 06-10-03: DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service Initial Disclosures ( R. 
43); 
6. 06-13-03: DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service for Discovery ( R. 44) 
7. 06-16-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Rule 45 
(b)(4) Request ( R. 45-46); 
8. 06-16-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Plaintiff s Rule 26 (a)(1) 
Supplemental Initial Disclosures ( R. 47-48); 
9. 06-18-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate for Written Discovery and Notice of 
Deposition for Byron Chester Mock ( R. 49-50); 
10.06-25-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Services of Plaintiff s Second Rule 
45(b)(4) (R. 51-52); 
11.06-26-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Amended Notice of 
Deposition of Defendant Byron Mock ( R. 53-54); 
12.07-09-03: DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service for Discovery ( R. 55-56) 
13.07-28-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service for Discovery ( R. 59-60) 
14. 08-06-03: DEFENDANT'S Notice of Deposition ( R. 61-62); 
15.08-26-03: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Services of Second Amended 
Notice of Deposition ( R. 63-64); 
16.08-26-03: PLAINTIFF'S Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Byron 
Mock ( R. 65-66) 
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17.09-09-03: DEFENDANT'S Amended Notice of Deposition (R. 67-68); 
18.10-06003: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service for Written Discovery 
Second set of Production and Interrogatory and Notice of Deposition ( R. 69-
70); 
19.10-28-03: PLAINTIFF'S Second Set of Supplemental Rule 26(a)(1) Initial 
Disclosures ( R. 71-72; 
20.11-03-03 
21.11-07-03 
DEFENDANT'S Notice of continued Deposition (R. 73-74) 
DEFENDANT'S Certificate of Service for Discovery (R. 75); 
22.11-11-03: DEFENDANT'S Amended Notice of continued Deposition ( R. 
76-77) 
23.05-17-04: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Service of Plaintiff s Expert 
Witness designation ( R. 91-92); 
24.06-28-04 
25.08-20-04 
26.09-16-04 
27.09-30-04 
28.12-30-04 
DEFENDANT'S Notice of Depositions (R. 93-96); 
DEFENDANT'S Notice of Deposition ( R. 97-98); 
DEFENDANT'S Notice of Deposition ( R. 99-100); 
DEFENDANT'S Offer of Judgment ( R. 101-102); 
DEFENDANT'S Amended Notice of Deposition ( R. 103-104); 
29.08-15-04: PLAINTIFF'S Certificate of Readiness for Trial ( R. 108-110); 
30. Appellant was represented by Charles A. Gruber from the onset of the 
complaint up and through September 23, 2005. (See Index Record pages 1-8, 
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117 - 120) This representation was based upon a contractual agreement 
entered into between the parties. 
31 .Appellant Robert L. Face has a brain injury and the court was advised by his 
physician that he is unable to represent himself. (Index Record page 135) 
{Emphasis Added} 
32.Discovery consisted of all phases of discovery. On September 15, 2005, a 
hearing took place, which was suppose to be a scheduling conference, 
however, no one can determine exactly what occurred at this time. (R.l 14-
116) 
33.Plaintiff timely requested a transcript of the September 15, 2005 hearing. (R. 
176 - 177), however no transcript of the September 15, 2005 hearing has been 
produced. (R. 181 -183) 
34.On September 16, 2005, a hearing was held before Judge Deno Himonas 
without any notice to the appellants. (See index) 
35.During September 16, 2005 hearing, Judge Himonas asked "... I understand, 
Mr. Gruber that you intend to withdraw. (Transcript September 16, 2005, 
hearing page 2, line 15-16) 
36. Appellant's prior counsel responded, "I will withdraw at the direction of my 
clients, your Honor ...." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 2, line 
17-18) 
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37. At no time did appellants direct or consent to Charles A. Gruber withdrawal, 
nor does the record reflect that the appellants requested Mr. Gruber withdraw 
as appellants counsel. (See the transcript and record) 
38.When Mr. Gruber stated, "my clients honestly want someone else." The Court 
responded, "I'm not concerned about that." and followed it up with "Yeah, not 
concerned about it at all." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 4, 
lines 1 - 4) 
39.Respondent's counsel, who had been attempting to settle the case, 
acknowledged having conversation with Mr. Gruber concerning withdrawal of 
appellant's counsel by stating "... Mr. Gruber explained that yesterday very 
well." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 3, line 16) 
40.Mr. Plant prompted the court to move forward. (Transcript September 16, 
2005, hearing page 4, line 6-8) 
41.The Court ordered, "So why don't we say 20 days from today in which to 
appear or appoint counsel." Well, let's have it 20 days from today in which to 
appear or appoint." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 4, line 9 -
10,22-23,25-26) 
42.Mr. Plant verified that the court wanted "... And so let me make sure, your 
Honor, so I don't mess up the order, doing 3:30 on the 18th as a scheduling 
conference, and they have 20 days from today to appoint new counsel or 
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appear in person, right? The Court: "Yes"(Transcript September 16, 2005, 
hearing page 6, line 3) 
43. The Court asked, "... if Mr. Gruber were to withdraw right now there would 
be an automatic 20 day period in which he would be required to give notice." 
(Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 6, line 8-10) 
44.Mr. Plant responded "Right." (Transcript September 16, 2005, hearing page 6, 
line 11) 
45.On September 1, 2004, Mr. Gruber verified in writing the fact "that he would 
be there until the end." (R. 130 - 134) 
46. On September 23, 2005, Mr. Gruber filed his notice of withdrawal. (R. 117-
120) 
47.On September 27, 2005, respondent's counsel filed Notice to appear or 
appoint counsel within 20 days. (R. 121 - 122) 
48.On September 28, 2005, respondent's counsel obtained signature of Judge 
Himonas requiring plaintiffs to find new counsel or appear in person on or 
before October 5, 2005 while setting a scheduling conference to be held on 
October 18, 2005 at 3:30 p.m. to establish a discovery plan and if possible set 
the matter for trial. (R. 123 - 125) 
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49.Plaintiff s filed an ex-parte motion for enlargement of time to respond on 
October 17, 2005 along with attached affidavit and letter from Dr. Joe 
Murdock, M.D. (R. 128 - 135) 
50.Court proceeded with hearing October 17, 2005. 
51 .Appellant Jackie Face informed the Court that".. .We certainly do not want to 
be pro se." (Transcript October 17, 2005, hearing page 4, lines 10 - 11) 
52.The Court responded "I understand, and I, ... No problem, I'll give you the 
time that you need." "That's no problem. So why don't you - when you 
obtain Counsel if you would do me the courtesy — (Transcript October 17, 
2005, hearing page 4, lines 12, 14 - 15, 17- 18). 
53.Jackie responded "Certainly will." (Transcript October 17, 2005, hearing 
page 4, line 19) 
54.On February 14, 2006, respondent filed motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute. (R. 150- 153) 
55.Appellants filed motion for additional time to have new counsel respond to 
defendant's motion to dismiss and attached affidavit February 27, 2006. (R. 
154-157) 
56. After respondent noticed motion to dismiss for decision and having not 
received any response to pending motion for enlargement Ms. Face noticed 
for decision learning that case had been dismissed ( Exhibit A). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Lindberg erred by failing to show facts rising to the level which 
supports or justifies dismissal of our case with prejudice, considering our case 
involves a disabled person with a brain injury unable to act or represent himself. 
The lower court erred in granting respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice, 
and by erroneously concluding that "any injustice resulting from this dismissal lies 
solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs." (R. 160 - 164) Judge Lindberg 
acknowledged "In fact, it is telling that they have not even attempted to respond to 
the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants in February 2006, other than to again 
ask for an extension of time." "Once their counsel withdrew, Plaintiffs received 
repeated extensions to appoint new counsel, all the while protesting that they could 
not represent themselves." (R. 160 - 164, paragraph 12 and 14). 
Some of the pertinent facts not addressed in the memorandum decision 
include: 
(1) plaintiffs counsel was allowed to withdraw in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner absent plaintiffs knowledge, consent or input (R. 130-134); 
(2) The pending extension of time was seeking the court to allow new 
counsel to respond; 
(3) Robert L. Face is disabled with a brain injury unable or in any condition 
to represent himself or respond (R. 135); 
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(4) both parties were involved in ongoing settlement discussions (101 - 102); 
(5) new discovery involving causation of brain injury was being explored; 
(6) complexities of a case involving a brain injury; 
(7) Prior Judge Himonus statement "No problem, I will give you the time 
you need."; 
(8) lower court failure to rule on pending motion for enlargement of time; 
(9) respondent's counsel having failed to prepare an order as agreed and 
specifically instructed by the court during September 16, 2005 hearing; 
(10) after certificate of readiness was filed respondents failures to take action 
in moving case forward, other than filing a motion to dismiss after plaintiffs lost 
their counsel; and 
(11) No hearing having been held in relation to disposing of plaintiff s case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW 
DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO ENSURE THAT MANDATORY 
PROVISIONS, WHICH ARE CLASSIFIED AS IMPERATIVES UNDER 
RULE 74 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WERE FOLLOWED. 
While appellants understanding is that Section 78-51-36, U.C.A. 1953 has 
been repealed, similar language is contained under Rule 74 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. It is reasonable to conclude that Rule 74 was enacted to provide similar 
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if not identical protections. The court in Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1977) 
"The foregoing clearly appears to have been enacted to safeguard a litigant 
who finds himself without counsel and prevents further proceedings until he again 
has counsel and chooses to proceed pro se. It is not a court directive nor does it 
exact any penalty against the litigant who fails for one reason or another to engage 
new counsel since, by its own terms, it affords him the alternative of appearing in 
person. Consequently, when a litigant does fail to engage new counsel, that, in and 
of itself, is not an adequate basis to default him or to dismiss as against him with 
prejudice." 
The court first declares that the foregoing was "enacted to safeguard a 
litigant who finds himself without counsel and prevent proceedings until he again 
has counsel or chooses to proceed pro se." Simply put, the district court in this 
action should not have proceeded until either the appellants retained counsel or 
choose to proceed pro se. The later "choose to proceed pro se" is a clear issue that 
can be resolve first. Appellant, Mrs. Face made it clear to the court that".. .We 
certainly do not want to be proceed pro se." I further made it clear that my 
husband could not appear or represent himself due to his disability. In fact, I 
provided the court with a letter indicating he "could not represent himself." by his 
physician. 
Like in this action, neither appellants can or want to represent ourselves 
because we lack necessary skills to prosecute this action to a successful conclusion. 
That is the reason why we hired a professional. Appellant, Ms. Face made it clear 
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to the court that neither I nor my husband could represent ourselves. Especially 
considering, Mr. Face is disabled with a serious and debilitating brain injury. 
The record reflects that appellant Mrs. Face made diligent and continued 
efforts to obtain an attorney, but could not find one. This was conveyed to the 
court. Therefore, under both of the aforementioned criteria the court should not 
have proceeded until one of the two conditions were met. This is where the district 
court clearly abused its discretion in dismissing this action. 
Lastly, the court made it clear when it stated, 
"It is not a court directive nor does it exact any penalty against the litigant 
who fails for one reason or another to engage new counsel since, by its own terms, 
it affords him the alternative of appearing in person. Consequently, when a litigant 
does fail to engage new counsel, that, in and of itself, is not an adequate basis to 
default him or to dismiss as against him with prejudice." 
The lower court failed to adhere to the high court directions. The lower 
court punished appellants because they did not or could not find counsel. The high 
court also made it clear that a court will not dismiss an action based solely on the 
failure to engage counsel. That is the exact reason why the lower court dismissed 
this action. 
After having litigated this case to the filing of a questionable certificate of 
readiness for trial, the lower court states ".. .counsel for Plaintiffs informed the 
Court that he would be withdrawing as counsel." (R. 160 - 164 paragraph 7) Judge 
Lindberg does not refer to or cite which telephonic conference this matter relates 
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too. More importantly, appellant's counsel failed to motion the court and obtain an 
order for withdrawal, which is mandatory under Rule 74 U.R.C.P..1 
No record of the September 15, 2005, conference has been made available. 
During a hearing held September 16, 2005, the court stated ".. .All right. I 
understand, Mr. Gruber, that you intend to withdraw?" Mr. Gruber responded ".. .1 
will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor.". The record is silent as 
to appellants ever directing Mr. Gruber to withdraw. The court failed to require 
plaintiffs prior counsel to submit any motion for withdrawal to obtain court order 
allowing withdrawal as required which would have alerted us to the fact our 
counsel was withdrawing. This would have afforded us an opportunity to be heard. 
While everyone should be afforded this most reasonable accommodation, Mr. Face 
is disabled with a brain injury unable to represent himself (R. 135). Further, in 
addition to requiring a motion to withdraw, Rule 74 U.R.C.P. (2004) also required 
counsel to obtain an order from the court. The record is silent as to any motion or 
order for withdrawal. To be in compliance with Rule 74 U.R.C.P. appellants 
1
 Rule 74(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures (2005) states, 
"If a motion is not pending or a certificate for readiness of trial has been filed, an 
attorney may withdraw from a case by filing with the court ands served upon all 
parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address 
of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no certificate 
of readiness for trial has been filed. If a motion is pending or certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed, an attorney may not withdraw except upon 
motion and order of the court. The motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of 
any pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing." 
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submit that we were entitled to notice of the motion so as to allow us an 
opportunity to be heard. Appellants submit that Mr. Gruber's statement".. .1 can 
assure you this isn't a tactic, and I know Terry knows this that I wouldn't do this, 
but it's not - it's my clients honestly want someone else." (R. 182 pages 3 & 4, 
lines 25, 26, 1) was a confession for we were not even aware this would or was 
taking place. Appellants can not understand the courts response "I'm not 
concerned about that.", "Yeah, not concerned about it at all." ( R. 182 pages 4, 
lines 2 & 4). Mr. Gruber had obviously not filed a motion to withdraw based upon 
the record and his earlier statement ""I will withdraw at the direction of my clients, 
your Honor" (R. 182 page 2, lines 17 & 18). After a certificate of readiness was 
filed, why would the court consider allowing Mr. Gruber to withdraw absent any 
motion, questions or at least input by appellants? 
BOTH COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF'S (OFFICERS 
OF THE COURT) FAILED TO FOLLOW IMPARITIVE PROVISIONS 
UNDER RULE 74 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES. 
While both counsel for plaintiffs and defendants knew or should have known 
procedures required for withdrawal under Rule 74 U.R.C.P., neither officer of the 
court ensured that imperative provisions were complied with. Appellants sought 
transcript of the September 15, 2005, hearing of which no record has been made 
available (R. 176 - 177, 181). On September 16, 2005, one month following 
plaintiff having filed a certificate of readiness for trial without plaintiffs 
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knowledge, a hearing was held (R. 182) wherein the court stated ".. .All right. I 
understand, Mr. Gruber, that you intend to withdraw?" Mr. Gruber responded ".. .1 
will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor." Again, at no time have 
appellants ever directed Mr. Gruber to withdraw (R. 130 - 134). When Mr. Gruber 
stated that my clients honestly want someone else...." The court responded "I'm 
not concerned about that." and followed it up with "Yeah, not concerned about it at 
all." (R. 182 page 4, lines 1 - 4). Respondent's counsel who had been attempting 
to settle this case, acknowledged having conversation, absent any motion for 
withdrawal, with Mr. Gruber stating ".. .Mr. Gruber explained that yesterday very 
well."(R. 182 pages 3, line 16). Respondents counsel then prompted the court to 
move forward (R. 182 page 4, line 6 - 8). When the Court asked ".. .if Mr. Gruber 
were to withdraw right now there would be an automatic 20 day period in which he 
would be required to give notice — Mr. Plant responded "Right." (R. 182 pages 6, 
lines 8 - 11). Appellants have been unable to confirm Mr. Plant's verification to 
the court for Rule 74 U.R.C.P. does not state that our counsel is allowed 20 days to 
file notice but rather Rule 74 U.R.C.P. mandates that once the certificate of 
readiness for trial was filed, appellant's counsel may not withdraw without first 
filing a motion to withdraw and obtaining a court order. It is reasonable to 
conclude that said motion is designed to allow litigants an opportunity to be heard 
and lodge any objections. The record in this case is clear that plaintiffs prior 
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counsel filed a certificate of readiness for trial on 08-15-05 (R. 108 - 110). The 
record is silent that any motion for withdrawal was ever filed as required or does 
the record reflect any court order specifically granting any such motion. 
Respondent's counsel goes further to confuse issues by agreeing to prepare an 
order (R. 182 page 4, lines 17, 18, 25, 26, page 5, lines 25, 26, page 6, lines 1, 2, 3, 
17, 18) consistent with directions of the court during the September 16, 2005 
hearing. The record is silent as to any order in compliance with instructions of the 
court. Officers of the Court moved forward in a manner both arbitrary and 
capricious violating mandatory provisions set forth under Rule 74 (a) and (b) 
U.R.C.P. (2004) and lower court instructions. Instead, on September 28, 2005 
respondents counsel obtained the court's signature of an order based upon 
September 15, 2005 (no record) requiring plaintiffs to appear or appoint counsel 
within seven (7) days on or before October 5, 2005. The following day Mr. Plant 
then files a notice to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days? We didn't even 
receive notices 20 days prior to scheduled October 18, 2005 hearing (R. 130 - 134). 
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POINT II 
DISTRICT COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE CLAIMING NO SUBSTANTIAL 
WORK ON CASE FOR EIGHTEEN (18) MONTHS WAS AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 
Judge Lindberg cited Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. 
Lars en Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)( R. 160 - 164 paragraph 
11) in her memorandum decision (R. 160-164 paragraph 11). Said case does not 
support dismissal with prejudice in this instance. In that case, supra, motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed sixteen (16) months after commencement 
of the lawsuit (after no proceedings other than a motion to dismiss), wherein the 
court denied the motion. In this action, the record is replete with evidence that 
plaintiffs performed interrogatories, admissions, production of documents, 
subpoenas and depositions in addition to law and motion over the initial twenty 
(20) months (See Relevant Statement of Facts above). Under the above referenced 
case, approximately fifteen (15) months later (during which time some discovery 
took place) a second motion to dismiss was granted. The Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for trial stating in part as follows (at page 879): 
"it is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move 
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even more 
important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of courts is to 
afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In 
conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to favor granting relief 
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from default judgment where there isn't any reasonable excuse, unless it will result 
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." 
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to give proper weight to the 
higher priority; and that under the circumstances herein, the order of dismissal with 
prejudice was an abuse of discretion." (Emphases Added). 
In addition to mere length of time since the suit was filed, lower court also 
cites five factors ( R. 160-164, paragraph 11) to be utilized when determining 
whether or not justifiable excuse exists for the delay in moving the case along as 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, designed to help determine whether a party 
has shown a justifiable excuse for its failure to prosecute as follows: 
1. conduct of both parties; 
2. opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; 
3. what each party has done to move the case forward; 
4. the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the 
other side; and 
5. most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
When applying these rules to our case it appears that the scales tip heavily in 
favor of vacating the order of dismissal and remanding the case for further 
proceedings or in the alternative the dismissal be reversed and ordered as without 
prejudice to the commencement of a new lawsuit. (1) Based upon the record, 
appellant's do not understand or agree with lower court's assessment that".. .what 
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discovery has occurred it appears to have been driven primarily by the defendants" 
(R. 160-164, paragraph 13). The record is clear that both parties pursued discovery 
of which appellant's initiated discovery (See Relevant Statement of Facts above). 
Appellants accommodated Appellees delays during discovery due to Mr. Mock's 
health condition through rescheduling of his deposition (R. 49 - 50, 53 - 54 and 65 
- 66). While appellees may have performed more depositions, appellants bore 
costs and time necessary for Robert Face to undergo testing, diagnostics and 
evaluations of injuries through numerous physicians. Appellants take issue with 
lower courts averments that we failed to fulfill our repeated promises and was 
totally non responsive since February, 2006. We diligently sought new counsel. 
Who wants a case prepared by counsel who files a certificate for readiness of trial 
and then was allowed to abandon the case, which also has a lien filed against it. 
Appellants disagree with lower court's assumption "Defendants apparently ran out 
of patience and filed present motion..." ( R. 160 - 164 paragraph 9). It was 
conveyed to appellants that the attorney reviewing our case in February, 2006 
contacted Mr. Plant who just days thereafter filed the motion to dismiss knowing 
we were actively seeking replacement counsel, remembering the court advised "No 
problem, I will give you the time that you need.". In response appellants filed a 
motion for enlargement to have counsel respond, remembering that Mr. Face is 
disabled with a brain injury unable to represent himself. Respondent's motion 
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served to further frustrate and discourage any attorney from wanting to take the 
case. While the court accused us of being silent, it is our understanding that we 
only had ten days to respond to a motion which we did in filing the motion for 
enlargement. Appellees were silent in failing to respond or object until June, 2006. 
Appellants did not understand the process and were awaiting a response from 
either the court or respondent while seeking counsel as the court had instructed. 
Shortly after receiving respondents notice for decision we attempted to file a notice 
for decision on our pending motion learning that the case had been dismissed (See 
attached exhibit A above). Respondents conduct is transparent when reviewing 
their response to our motion for enlargement to file opening brief in this court. 
Facts were misrepresented while attempting to dictate to this court how much time 
a disabled person with a brain injury needs to prepare a brief of such complexity; 
(2) Appellants were definitely subjected to a distinct disadvantage after their 
counsel was allowed to withdraw because Mr. Face is disabled with a brain injury 
unable to act or represent himself ( R. 135) while respondent on the other hand was 
allowed to ignore the court's order allowing us time to find counsel. In fact the 
week prior to the October 18, 2005 hearing, after Mr. Plant agreed to an extension 
he conveyed that our problem would be the court who wanted to get rid of our 
case. After the hearing, we felt Mr. Plant had misrepresented what was really 
going on. Respondents were also at a distinct advantage having deposed plaintiffs 
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knowing there financial situation prevented us from paying for counsel to appeal; 
(3) The record is silent as to ongoing settlement discussions other than defendants 
offer of judgment but does indicate appellees having done nothing since 
December, 2004 other than attend a telephone conference failing to prepare the 
order of the court as specifically agreed and advised during the September 16, 
2005 hearing (See section B. below). Respondent also discontinued prospect of 
settling case. Why settle if one can succeed in getting the court to throw out 
opponent's case. After appellant's attorney filed certificate of readiness for trial 
08-15-05 (R. 108 - 110) and was allowed to withdraw the following month (R. 117 
- 120) the record is clear that appellant's continued to diligently seek counsel (R. 
134-135, 182 page 4, lines 7 - 19, 141 - 143, 154-157). While both parties 
attended the October 18, 2005 telephonic conference appellees did nothing more to 
move case forward other than file a motion for dismissal. Appellants continued 
diligently seeking replacement counsel as instructed by the court ( R. 134 - 135, 
182 page 4, lines 7 - 19, 141 - 143, 154 - 157); (4) Appellants were subjected to 
extreme difficulties once their counsel was allowed to withdraw because Mr. Face 
is disabled with a brain injury unable to act or represent himself while appellees 
were at distinct advantage; (5) most important, appellants have been subjected to 
enormous injustice upon having our case foreclosed upon wherein significant time 
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energy and costs were expended as well as loosing relief sought while appellees 
reap the benefit of no further need to settle having escaped justice. 
Appellants believe that respondents took advantage of the rotation of judges 
for if Judge Himonus felt we were beyond limits, we believe he would have called 
for a hearing prior to dismissing our case. As for time lapse from January, 2005, 
appellants were advised that the courts favor settlement of cases if possible. We 
had no idea that our case was at risk when it was dismissed based upon the court 
granting us the time we needed. We knew we were doing all possible to replace 
counsel. One can only imagine the chilling effect which would occur if litigants 
are discouraged from taking time necessary to attempt settlements for fear of 
having our cases dismissed for inaction. While dismissal under some of the cases 
cited in Westinghouse case, supra; justified dismissal such as Thompson Ditch Co. 
v. Jackson. 29 Utah.2d 259, 508 P. 2d 528 (1973) (dismissal after 8 years delay 
affirmed); and Brasher Motor & Finance v. Brown, 23 Utah.2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 
(1969) (5 1/2 years delay with no activity justified dismissal) others cited do not 
such as Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah.2d 389, 885 P. 2d 624 
(1959); (8 years delay did not authorize dismissal) and Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah 
588, 150 P. 956 (1915) (3 year delay was insufficient). Our case was not subject to 
years of delays. 
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FAILURE TO OBTAIN COUNSEL 
It is unjust to reward respondent with dismissal when they failed to prepare 
an order as agreed and specifically instructed by the court, move forward with 
withdrawal of counsel outside mandated provisions under Rule 74 U.R.C.P. failing 
to object to withdrawal or move the case forward themselves and then just days 
after receiving a call from counsel, plaintiffs were attempting to retain, motioned a 
new Judge for dismissal less than 120 days after Judge Himonus stated he would 
afford plaintiffs the time needed to obtain counsel. Respondents too had delayed 
the case through rescheduling defendant Mock's deposition to accommodate his 
health condition (See above). We did not understand Mr. Gruber's statement that 
the court forced said certificate rather it is apparent that he disappeared shortly 
thereafter. In January, 2005 discovery was near completion with exception to 
newly discovered information involving causation of Robert's brain injury as it 
related to the accident. Appellants attended appointments in January 2005 and Dr. 
Matsuo was evaluating further testing which we understand has not been 
completed. We were advised that our case was engaged in ongoing settlement 
discussions beginning in late 2004 within 60 days of having received respondent's 
offer of judgment (R. 101 - 102). Just prior to withdrawal we received information 
that our prior counsel, having been a sole practitioner, was unable to fulfill his 
contractual obligations at which time shortly thereafter we agreed to get a second 
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opinion to determine whether we should settle for an amount Mr. Gruber said 
appellees would accept. At no time did we discuss withdrawal which was 
accomplished absent our knowledge, consent and input. Both counsel moved 
forward with withdrawal absent their having objections. We provided the court 
with a letter from our primary physician who explained Mr. Face's inability to 
represent himself (R. 135) while Ms. Face informed the court during October 18, 
2005 hearing ".. .We most certainly do not want to be pro se." (R. 183 page 4, lines 
10 and 11). The court responded "No problem. I'll give you the time you need." ( 
R. 182, page 4, lines 14 and 15). We interpreted the court's statement to mean just 
that. We diligently sought new counsel and continued to do so (R. 182, page 4, 
lines 7-10, 154-157). 
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE AND WAS AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Under Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah.2d 1, 354, P. 2d 
559, 561. when a party is subject to dismissal with prejudice based upon record, 
said dismissal must be supported by evidence when viewed in light most favorable 
to party subject to dismissal. That no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment of dismissal as a matter of law. When 
applying this rule to the facts of this case, one must conclude that no unreasonable 
delay occurred when appellants were engaged in genuine settlement discussions up 
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until shortly before their counsel was allowed to withdraw and had diligently 
performed discovery up through that same year. This case has not sat dormant in 
the court system for years but rather was actively pursued when possible. Totality 
of circumstances also tip the scales heavily in favor of vacating the order of 
dismissal and remanding the case for trial or in the alternative the dismissal should 
be ordered as without prejudice to the commencement of a new lawsuit. That 
appellants diligently sought counsel after our counsel had been allowed to 
withdraw which was our understanding as to what the court advised. Under 
Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747. when* appraising a dismissal 
granted against appellants, we are entitled to have all the evidence reviewed, 
together with every logical inference which may fairly be drawn there from in the 
light most favorable to us. This was not a case of unreasonable neglect. 
POINT III 
PLAITIFFfS RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS WERE VIOLATED IN HAVING 
BEEN DENIED OUR DAY IN COURT OR TO BE HEARD 
Amendment V of the United States Constitution states, "No person 
shall.. .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
without due process of law." This is echoed through the 14th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and our State Constitution. 
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The appellants through this action has had our due process rights violated. 
The most current and vital is the due process violation that encompasses and 
surround the withdrawal of their counsel. 
Rule 74 U.R.C.P. states, "If a motion is not pending or a certificate for 
readiness of trial has been filed, an attorney may withdraw from a case by filing 
with the court and served upon all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of 
withdrawal shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no 
motion is pending and no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. If a 
motion is pending or certificate of readiness for trial has been filed, an 
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court The 
motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the 
date and purpose of any scheduled hearing," 
In this action, a certificate of readiness for trial was filed with the court. 
Under the rules it specifically forbids an attorney from withdrawing from a case 
except upon motion and order of the court. The withdrawing counsel would be 
required to serve the motion upon the other parties to properly give notice of the 
impending withdrawal. Those parties would then be given an opportunity to 
respond and be heard concerning the matter. 
In this case, appellants counsel did not prepare, execute or serve a motion to 
withdraw as is required under the rule. Counsel most definitely failed to notify the 
parties. The actions of appellees counsel, cited above, was just as abusive, 
underhanded and unethical tactics. This violated our rights to notice and to be 
heard. Both counsel failed to comply with the requirements while appellants 
counsel knew we did not fire or release him from his contractual obligations in this 
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action. Appellants counsel has breached the contractual agreement, which is 
binding in this case and appellants counsel knew the only way out of this action 
was to seek judicial approval. However, this does not negate the contractual 
obligations appellants counsel had with the appellants. Additionally, both counsel 
failed to comply with nearly every provision of the rule. 
Rule 74 is a rule that utilizes an "Imperative." The rule clearly states, "..., 
an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court." This 
did not happen. 
Therefore, this alone should be reason for this court to reverse this action 
and remand it back to the trial court for further proceedings. It should also be 
grounds for this court to order Mr. Gruber's withdrawal null and void. 
POINT IV 
COURTS FAILURE TO ENSURE APPELLES WERE PROTECTED 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT OF 1990 "ADA" WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
To qualify under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 "ADA" a 
person must establish the following: 
1. A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual; 
2. A record of such an impairment; or 
3. being regarded as having such an impairment. 
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In this action appellant, Ms. Face established by way of letter from our 
attending physician that Mr. Face has a severe brain injury. This letter meets the 
requirements of paragraph 1 and 2 above. 
Based on this information, the court should have taken more reasonable 
steps in protecting his rights under this action. Instead the court effectively placed 
a tremendous ongoing burden on appellant's shoulders by allowing counsel to 
withdraw. Considering the facts of this action, the court for whatever reason then 
forced such drastic remedy as to dismiss action with prejudice, not even having 
held a hearing prior to doing so, to give appellants an opportunity to be heard and 
cite their understandings. The lower court acknowledges that this is a harsh 
remedy. The court was under a duty to protect the interests of appellants, 
especially because Mr. Face is disabled 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS WARRANT COST AND FEES 
Based upon respondent moving forward in violation of strict mandates 
contained under Rule 74, U.R.C.P. for withdrawal of counsel, failure to prepare 
order of September 16, 2005 hearing as specifically agreed and instructed by the 
court, motioning new Judge for dismissal rather than first confer with plaintiffs, set 
for hearing or acknowledge Judge Himonas advisement that the court would give 
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plaintiffs the time needed to replace counsel appellants are seeking reimbursement 
of all costs and expenses. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the appellants have been seriously harmed by and through the 
actions of the trial court including actions of both attorneys. Appellants 
respectfully request this court, in the interest of justice, to reverse the trial courts 
order dismissing this action with prejudice and remand back for further 
proceedings ordering Mr. Gruber's retention of counsel to allow appellants an 
opportunity to be heard. In the alternative, reverse and dismiss without prejudice 
to the commencement of a new lawsuit. 
Dated this 5th day off ebniary 2007. 
Robert L. Face 
Uju M< <\*&\ U_s 
Jackie N. Face 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jackie N. Face, certify that on 02-05-07,1 served a copy of the attached 
Opening Brief upon Terry M. Plant, the counsel for the appellees in this matter, by 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 
address: 
Terry M. Plant 
PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANEL 
136 East South Temple Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT AND JACKIE FACE , 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 
Plaintiffs, MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE 
vs 
Civ No 030905851 
BEUTLER ENTERPRISES, INC , MOBILE 
HOME TRANSPORTERS, and BYRON Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
CHESTER MOCK, 
Defendants 
[^1 At issue before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss foi failuie to prosecute Aftei 
reviewing the parties' pleadings the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the case with 
prejudice, pursuant to Utah R Q v P 41(b) 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
TJ2 This case involves a suit filed on or about March 14, 2003 by Plaintiffs Robert and Jackie 
Face alleging that defendants were negligent in the opeiation of a tractor-ti ail er causing peisonal 
mjuiytoMr Face, and a loss of consortium claim on behalf of Mis Face 
1J3 An attorney planning report and proposed scheduling oidei were submitted to the Court 
on or about May 13, 2003, but the Court declined to enter the Older because the proposed older 
exceeded the piesumptive time limits provided for by Court rules In its minute entry declining 
to sign the proposed ordei the Court noted that absent good cause foi delay, the case would have 
to be certified for trial within 330 days after the Answei was filed, oi the it would be dismissed 
|^4 An amended Case Management Ordei was appioved by the Court on May 28, 2003 
Pmsuant to that Order the parties indicated to the Court that the mattei would be leady for tual 
byMaich5,2004 
1J5 The parties exchanged initial disclosuies and conducted discoveiy though the balance of 
2003 On or about December 23, 2003 the parties submitted a Stipulation and Joint Motion foi a 
second amendment to the Case Management Older The Court accepted the stipulation and 
signed the pioposed second amended Older That Order extended the leadmess foi trial date to 
October 1,2004 
TJ6 Based on the case record it appears that discovery continued through January 25, 2005. 
After that date, no action appears to have taken place on the case, so the Court noticed the case 
for an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. The OSC was scheduled for September 6, 2005. hi response, Plaintiffs' counsel filed 
a certificate of readiness for trial and asked that the OSC hearing be stricken. 
f7 The Court then scheduled a telephonic conference with the parties, at which time counsel 
for Plaintiffs informed the Court that he would be withdrawing as counsel and Plaintiffs would 
secure new counsel. As a result of that telephonic conference the Court ordered that Plaintiffs 
find new counsel or appear pro se within 20 days. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74, defendants 
filed their notice to appear or appoint successor counsel. A follow up telephonic scheduling 
conference was scheduled for October 18, 2005 to finalize what needed to occur to bring the 
matter to trial. 
K8 On the day prior to the scheduled telephonic conference, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Enlargement of Time to Appoint Counsel, seeking a thirty (30) day extension. Defendants did not 
oppose that extension, and Plaintiffs were then given until November 18, 2005 to secure new 
counsel. 
T|9 Again the day before that extension was to run out, Plaintiffs again filed another request 
for extension of time, this time asking for an additional 60 days. Although there is no express 
entry in the record, it appears that Defendants again acquiesced to the requested extension. 
However, by February 14, 2006, Defendants apparently ran out of patience and filed the present 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
1J10 On February 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a third affidavit and Motion for Extension of time, 
this time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Since that time, Plaintiffs have taken no further 
action to move this case forward. On June 16, 2006, Defendants filed a notice to submit on their 
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs have not responded. 
ANALYSIS 
f 11 The plaintiff bears the duty to prosecute its case with due diligence. Charlie Brown 
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute its case with due diligence, a trial court has discretion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs case. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 
876, 879 (Utah 1975); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc., 740 P.2d at 1370. The Utah Supreme 
Court has set forth factors to help trial courts determine whether a party has shown a justifiable 
excuse for its failure to prosecute. In addition to the length of time that has lapsed, the relevant 
considerations are: "(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has to move 
the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of 
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State 
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544 
P.2d at 879. These factors are not to be considered in isolation. Countiy Meadows Convalescent 
Ctr v Utah Dept of Health, Div Of Health Care Fin , 851 P 2d 1212, 1215 (Utah Ct App 
1993) Rather, the totality of the circumstances should be consideied when determining if an 
action should be dismissed for failure to piosecute with due diligence Id 
HI 2 As noted above, there has been no substantive action to move the case forwaid since 
January 2005 when defendants conducted the last of then depositions of Mi Face's ti eating 
physicians After the Court on its own motion scheduled the OSC healing, the Plaintiffs' 
counsel certified the mattei foi trial and then withdrew Plaintiffs have been given extension 
aftei extension to secuie new counsel, yet they have utterly failed to do so In fact, it is telling 
that they have not even attempted to respond to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants in 
Februaiy 2006, othei than to again ask for an extension of time 
HI 3 It has been more than thiee (3) years since the case was filed, more than eighteen (18) 
months since theie was any substantive work on this case (and what discovery has occuned it 
appeals to have been driven primarily by the defendants), and ovei nine (9) months since the 
Court initiated the OSC and Plaintiffs began seeking extensions of time The Court believes 
enough is enough It is evident Plaintiffs have failed to fulfill their lepeated pi onuses to the 
Court, and have been totally non-responsive since February 2006 
TJ14 As lefeienced above, in evaluating a motion to dismiss the Court must considei what 
actions, if any, weie taken by each side in oidei to move the case foiwaid In this case, Plaintiffs 
weie clearly on notice of this Court's intention to manage its caseload and not allow mattei s to 
languish foi yeais without action Once their counsel withdiew, Plaintiffs received repeated 
extensions to appoint new counsel, all the while protesting that they could not repiesent 
themselves 
1J15 hi contrast to Plaintiffs' inaction, it appears that the defendants have actively pursued this 
action They have engaged m substantial discovery, including deposing Mi Face's tieatment 
pioviders 
HI 6 Defendants have not addiessed how they will be prejudiced if this mattei is continued, but 
that piong, by itself, is not determinative The bui Jen was on Plaintiffs to show why dismissal 
would not be wan anted on these facts, or to offer reasonable excuse foi then lack of diligence 
Based on Plaintiffs' failure to lespond to the motion to dismiss, and the fact they have remained 
silent for the subsequent 5 months since the motion was filed, the Court can reasonably conclude 
that Plaintiffs have nothing to offer that would justify then continued inaction 
HI 7 To be sure, a dismissal will prejudice the Plaintiffs, who will then be foieclosed from 
pui suing the lehef sought However, the Court's sense of justice is not offended because of this 
outcome It was completely withm Plaintiffs' contiol to act, and they chose not to do so The 
Court and defendants have been more than patient and accommodating to Plaintiffs' lequests hi 
short, any "injustice resulting from this dismissal lies solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs 
HI 8 The Court realizes that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction The facts of this 
case, howevei, amply justify this sanction 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Tfl9 Defendants' Motion To Dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED. This memorandum 
decision shall serve as the final order and judgment m this case; the parties need not submit a 
separate order. 
Entered this 28th day of June, 2006. 
Third DistnVpjCoiirt 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 030905851 by the method and on the date 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTM»T COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAlfecOUtff V^TATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND JACKIE FACE, 
Plaintiff 
BEUTLER ENTERPRISES, INC., 
MOBILE HOME TRANSPORTERS, 
and BYRON CHESTER MOCK, 
Defendants. 
Civil No.: 030905851 
Honorable Judge Lindberg 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ON MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO HAVE 
NEW COUNSEL RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Comes now the plaintiffs Robert and Jackie Face, who make an informal special 
appearance, pursuant to Rule 6(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedures and moves the above entitled 
Court for an Order granting additional time to respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated 
February 13, 2006. 
There having been no timely objection filed by defendants, plaintiff respectfully submits 
that this motion is ripe to be decided and that another attorney is currently reviewing this matter 
and could respond with this court's permission. 
/ ^ ^ f l thi^27^4ay of June, 2006. | 
Robert Face 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I certify on this 27th day of June, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO HAVE NEW COUNSEL RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS" to be delivered by inserting the above referenced document 
in a sealed envelope and placing the same in the United States Postal System 
addressed to the following: 
US MAIL Postage Prepaid PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Terry M. Plant 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert Face 
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